A Robust Control Framework for Malware Filtering by Bloem, Michael et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
91
1.
22
93
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
2 N
ov
 20
09
1
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Michael Bloem, Tansu Alpcan, Member, IEEE, and Tamer Bas¸ar, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract— We study and develop a robust control framework
for malware filtering and network security. We investigate the
malware filtering problem by capturing the tradeoff between
increased security on one hand and continued usability of the
network on the other. We analyze the problem using a linear
control system model with a quadratic cost structure and develop
algorithms based on H∞-optimal control theory. A dynamic
feedback filter is derived and shown via numerical analysis to be
an improvement over various heuristic approaches to malware
filtering. The results are verified and demonstrated with packet
level simulations on the Ns-2 network simulator.
Index Terms— Network security, invasive software (malware)
filtering, control theory, H∞-optimal control.
I. INTRODUCTION
ATTACKS on computer networks, such as worm or denialof services attacks, are difficult to prevent in part due
to the challenge of detecting and stopping them while still
allowing legitimate network usage. Recent experience with
Internet worm attacks makes this point more clear: within 10
minutes the Slammer worm had infected 90% of vulnerable
computers in 2003 and the Code Red virus infected hundreds
of thousands of hosts in 2001 [1], [2]. The base-rate fallacy
captures the essence of this problem. Even if we have low
false-negative and false-positive rates in our detection of
malware, there is so much more legitimate network usage than
illegitimate usage that we end up with many false alarms [3].
The incredible variety in legitimate network traffic makes
accurately differentiating it from malicious traffic even more
challenging. A more detailed analysis of the detection of a
particular type of worm epidemic in [4] shows the challenge of
detecting some worm attacks even under idealized conditions.
In this specific case the base-rate fallacy again comes into play,
as “a substantial volume of ‘background radiation’” is to blame
for making the detection of random constant scanning worms
difficult. Intrusion detection systems must be constructed with
this dilemma in mind, and thus need to be conservative in their
operation.
According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statis-
tics, 70% of security problems originate within an organi-
zation, and 20% of respondents to an FBI survey indicated
that intruders had broken into or attempted to break into
their corporate networks in the last 12 months [5]. Therefore,
dynamic firewalls such as the Cisco Internetwork Operating
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System (IOS) firewall are an important form of internal
network security [5]. Our aim is to develop algorithms and
policies for such (re)configurable firewalls in order to filter
malware traffic such as worms, viruses, spam, and Trojan
horses.
We use H∞-optimal control theory to determine how to
dynamically change filtering rules or parameters in order to
ensure a certain performance level. We note that in H∞-
optimal control, by viewing the disturbance as an intelligent
maximizing opponent in a dynamic zero-sum game, who
plays with knowledge of the minimizer’s control action, one
evaluates the system under the worst possible conditions. This
approach applies naturally to the problem of malware response
because the traffic deviation resulting from a malware attack
is not merely random noise, but represents the efforts of an
intelligent attacker. Therefore, we determine the control action
that will minimize costs under these worst circumstances [6].
The resulting conservative controller works well even in light
of the base-rate fallacy problem. To the best of our knowledge,
this work represents the first application of robust control
theory to the problem of malware filtering.
A. Related work
There are several methods of dynamic packet filtering [7].
Perhaps the most common one is to dynamically change which
ports are open or closed. Stateful inspection of deeper layers
of packets allows for even more detailed filtering by creating
and maintaining information about the state of a current
connection [5]. Another possibility is to dynamically alter
the set of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which traffic
will be accepted [8]. An accurate attack packet discarding
scheme based on statistical processing has been proposed
in [9], where each packet is associated with a score that
reflects its legitimacy. Once the score of a packet is computed,
this scheme performs score-based selective packet discarding
where the dropping threshold is dynamically adjusted based
on the score distribution of recent incoming packets and the
current level of system overload.
Implicit to the network traffic filtering problem considered
in this article is the partitioning of a computer network into
various sub-networks for administrative and security purposes.
This approach is common, and a separate firewall is often
assigned to each sub-network. Zou et al. [10] have proposed
a “Firewall Network System” based on this very concept.
Cisco recommends their IOS firewalls for defending particular
sub-networks or LANs in a corporate network [5]. In [11],
quarantining these sub-networks is considered as a strategy to
slow the spread of worm epidemics. We note that although
the algorithms developed in this paper can be helpful for con-
figuring dynamic firewalls such as the ones described above,
2our main objective is to develop mathematical foundations and
algorithms for future security systems which will be even more
configurable and flexible. Finally, while we consider the case
of filtering packets, these techniques could also be applied to
filtering connections.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II discusses the problem of filtering network traffic with
dynamic firewalls separating sub-networks. We next derive
the H∞-optimal controller and state estimator in Section III.
Section IV reviews Matlab and Ns-2 simulations of the
H∞-optimal controller and demonstrates its performance in
comparison with other controllers. Concluding remarks and
directions for future research are presented in Section V.
II. NETWORK TRAFFIC FILTERING MODEL
In this section we present a linear system model for malware
traffic and study the problem of filtering network traffic to
prevent malware propagation. Consider a computer network
under the control of a single administrative unit, such as
a corporate network. Assume the network is divided into
sub-networks for administrative and security purposes [5].
While we will describe the model within this context, the
corresponding control framework can be applied to other
contexts by redefining the entities in question.
Let x(t) represent the number of malware packets that
traverse a link on their way to the destination sub-network
at time t originating from infected sources outside the sub-
network. We model this malware flow to the sub-network using
a linear differential equation with control and disturbance
terms:
x˙(t) = a x(t) + b u(t) + wa(t), (1)
where u(t) represents the number of packets that are filtered
at a particular time (t). Usually, only some proportion of
the packets filtered are actually malware related. Thus, the
parameter b corresponds to that proportion multiplied by
−1. In other words, (1 − b) is the proportion of filtered
packets that are not malware related. On the other hand, wa(t)
represents the number of malware packets added to the link at
time t intentionally by malicious sources or unintentionally
by hidden software running on hosts, both located outside
the sub-network considered. Thus u(t) and wa(t) represent,
for this specific sub-network, the packet filtering rate and
malware infiltration rate, respectively. The a value represents
the instantaneous proportion of malware packets on the link
that are actually delivered to the sub-network and is thus a
negative number.
Expanding the dimensions of the model in (1) leads to a set
of linear differential equations:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Dwa(t), (2)
where wa is defined as the vector of malware packets. In this
case both A and B are obtained simply by multiplying the
identity matrix by a and b, respectively. The D matrix imposes
a propagation model on the attack and quantifies how malware
is routed and distributed on this network. For the purposes
of this paper, it has zeros for its diagonal terms (intra-sub-
network malware traffic does not leave the sub-network), and
each column must sum to 1 to ensure conservation of packets.
In this version of the problem, the malware being sent to sub-
network i is a function of wj for j 6= i, the malicious traffic
generated by other sub-networks. This assumption on the
propagation of malware inherent to the form given to D allows
for a centralized filtering solution that considers network-
wide conditions. A decentralized version to this problem is
also possible, however. Overall, this model simplifies actual
network dynamics by assuming a linear system and using a
fluid approximation of traffic flow.
Let us denote by y(t) our measurement of the number of
inbound malicious packets prior to filtering. Note that the
separation between detection (y(t)) and response (u(t)) is
only at the conceptual level. In the implementation both may
occur on the same device. Inaccuracies in y(t) are inevitable
due to the challenging problem of distinguishing malicious
packets from legitimate ones [3]. To capture this uncertainty
formally, we define y(t) as
y(t) := Cx(t) + Ewn(t), (3)
where wn(t) is measurement noise of any form. Later, we
derive and apply the worst-case measurement noise wn(t).
Additionally, we define N := EET and assume that it is
positive definite, meaning that the measurement noise impacts
each dimension of the measured output. The C matrix models
the assumption that y(t) is higher than and proportional to
x(t). When implemented, entries of this constant matrix could
be measured from an analysis of packet filtering and the
calculations required for determining the optimal controller
could be rerun periodically.
Note that we do not make any assumption on how y(t)
is obtained. It could be the result of some statistical analysis
comparing the expected traffic to the measured traffic or be
based on a set of rules where packets with certain character-
istics are assumed to be malicious.
Similarly, wa(t) represents a worm attack, expressed in
terms of number of the malware packets sent from a sub-
network to other sub-networks at each time instant. More
precisely, it is the generated malware traffic flow rate in
terms of packets per time step. For example, if a worm is
very rapidly contacting new hosts and sending them packets,
then wa(t) would be large. However, we do not assume any
form on the attack. To simplify notation, we assume that the
measurement noise and attack disturbance are both part of the
vector w :=
[
w
T
a w
T
n
]T
.
The model at hand contains several simplifications and
assumptions. As was mentioned earlier, the components of the
B matrix are set to be constants, although in reality the value
of these components should change as x decreases, as there
are less malicious packets to be filtered, and we are filtering
packets we are less sure about. This quantity also depends on
the amount of legitimate network traffic on the link: if there is
a relatively large amount of legitimate network traffic then we
will incur more false-positives and thus end up filtering more
legitimate traffic. The B matrix is related to the false-negative
and false-positive ratios, but it is mostly determined by the
ratio of legitimate to illegitimate traffic as described in [3].
The exponential decay in the number of malware packets on
3the link (in the absence of control and disturbance) does not
exactly capture network dynamics, but with a high enough
rate of exponential decay, this assumption is quite realistic
when capacity constraints are not significant. The assumption
of a constant value for the C matrix is also an approximation,
as in reality the number of malware packets prior to filtering
will probably not be linearly dependent upon the number after
filtering. To summarize, this model simplifies actual network
performance by assuming linear dynamics.
Moreover, this model simplifies system dynamics by using
a fluid approximation of traffic flow. More specifically, this
model only approximately captures the fact that, in an actual
implementation, the number of malware packets measured
prior to filtering differs from the one that arrives at the sub-
network in the number of the filtered. Similarly, in order to
simplify the following calculations, we are approximating a
clearly discrete and event-driven system (a computer network)
with a continuous time system. This assumption should hold
when we consider the rapidity and frequency of packet arrivals
and transmissions along with the fine-grained time increments
of a computer network.
III. DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL CONTROLLER AND STATE
ESTIMATOR
Our objective now is to design an algorithm or controller
for traffic filtering given this imperfect measure of inbound
malicious packets. As part of the H∞-optimal control analysis
and design we introduce first the controlled output
z(t) := Hx(t) +Gu(t), (4)
where we assume that GTG is positive definite, and that no
cost is placed on the product of control actions and states:
HTG = 0. H represents a cost on malicious packets arriving
at a sub-network. A few other constraints that must be met for
this H∞-optimal control theory to apply are that (A, B) and
(A, D) be stabilizable, and (A, H) and (A, C) be detectable,
and these conditions readily hold in our case.
If x becomes negative, we are filtering legitimate packets
from the link. In other words, an equal penalty is assumed for
underfiltering and allowing worm-related traffic on a link and
also for overfiltering and preventing legitimate network traffic
from traversing the link. By weighting these two quantities
equally, we are in effect encouraging survivability: overfilter-
ing to prevent the spread of the worm but at the same time
crippling the network is penalized as much as allowing the
worm-related traffic to run rampant.
The cost on filtering legitimate traffic is actually more
complicated than indicated above. Recall that b specifies the
proportion of filtered traffic that is malware-related. Thus,
(1 − b) is the proportion of filtered traffic that is legitimate
(assuming x is positive). If we assign a cost of fl to filtering
legitimate packets when malware packets are on the link and
a cost of fa to the filtering action itself, the components g of
G can be specified as g = fl(1− b) + fa.
The cost of this system for the purpose of H∞ analysis is
defined by
L(x,u,w) =
‖z‖
‖w‖
, (5)
where ‖z‖2 :=
∫
∞
−∞
|z(t)|2dt and a similar definition applies
to ‖w‖2. This is a cost ratio rather than an actual cost, but
we will refer to it as the cost for simplicity. It captures
the proportional changes in z due to changes in w. More
intuitively, it is the ratio of the cost incurred by the system to
the corresponding attacker and measurement noise “effort’.’
There are a few assumptions and simplifications present in
this cost structure. We assign a cost to the malware packets, not
the infected and disabled hosts or servers themselves, which
are the often actually where the costs of malware occur. On
the other hand, malware traffic itself can dominate network re-
sources and thus be costly in its own right. Another assumption
is that we assign costs to traffic incoming to a sub-network
even if that sub-network is already infected, in which case the
incoming malicious traffic would be unimportant. In spite of
these two assumptions, this cost structure captures most of the
important characteristics of malware packet propagation.
H∞-optimal control theory not only applies very directly
and appropriately to the problem of worm response, but also
guarantees that a performance factor (the H∞ norm) will be
met. This norm can be thought of as the worst possible value
for the cost L and is bounded above by
γ∗ := inf
u
sup
w
L(u,w), (6)
which can also be viewed as the optimal performance level in
this H∞ context.
In order to actually solve for the optimal controller µ(y),
the number of packets to filter as a function of the inaccurately
measured number of inbound malicious packets, a correspond-
ing differential game is defined between the attackers and the
malware filtering system, which is parameterized by γ, where
γ > γ∗:
Jγ(u,w) = ‖z‖
2 − γ2‖w‖2. (7)
The malicious attackers try to maximize this cost function
in the worst-case by varying w while the malware filtering
algorithm minimizes it via the controller u. A similar appli-
cation of game theory, where attackers and intrusion detec-
tion/prevention system are modeled as players in a security
game, has been investigated in [12].
The optimal filtering strategy u = µγ(y) can be determined
from this differential game formulation for any γ > γ∗. It is
given by [6]
µγ(y) = −(G
TG)−1BT Z¯γxˆ, (8)
where Z¯γ is solved from
ATZ +ZA−Z(B(GTG)−1BT − γ−2DDT )Z +HTH = 0,
(9)
as its unique minimal positive definite solution, and xˆ is given
by
˙ˆx=
[
A− (B(GTG)−1BT − γ−2DDT )Z¯γ
]
xˆ
+
[
I − γ−2Σ¯γZ¯γ
]
−1
Σ¯γC
TN−1(y − Cxˆ), (10)
where Σ¯γ is the unique minimal positive definite solution of
AΣ+ΣAT −Σ(CTN−1C−γ−2HTH)Σ+DDT = 0. (11)
4Fig. 1
SAMPLE COMPUTER NETWORK TO BE ANALYZED.
Here xˆ is an estimate for x. This is a linear feedback controller
operating on a state estimate. Further, γ∗ is the smallest γ
such that ρ(Σ¯γZ¯γ) < γ2, where ρ(Λ) denotes the spectral
radius of the matrix Λ. The online calculation is simply a
multiplication by the estimate of the system state. Also note
that this controller requires a network-wide knowledge of the
system state estimate and thus this is a centralized control
solution.
There are a few assumptions implicit in this specific con-
troller formation. The various filters will have to send control
packets to each other, indicating their y values. Moreover, it
is assumed that these filters are able to convert a number of
packets to filter per time step (u(t)) into a filtering rule that
will implement that filtering rate. The packets that are most
likely to be malicious should be filtered first. Exactly how this
is done depends on the system implementation. For example,
a rule-based filter could implement more rules (block more
ports or IP addresses) or the sensitivity of an anomaly-based
detector could be increased when u(t) increases.
Remark III.1. The H∞-optimal controller derived here (8)
is a centralized control solution due to the D matrix, which
imposes a specific malware propagation model. However, we
can apply the same framework to each sub-network separately
by using (1) for each. This leads to a decentralized solution
consisting of independent scalar H∞-optimal controllers.
IV. SIMULATIONS
Consider the representative computer network shown in
Fig. 1. In this simple network configuration, each sub-network
or LAN has a dynamic firewall that filters incoming network
traffic. Each firewall communicates its malicious packet mea-
sure y to all other firewalls, where filtering decisions are made.
No centralized server is overseeing the filtering activity.
A. Simulation setup
Several attack types are simulated in Matlab on this network
topology in order to compare the H∞-optimal controller
with other controllers. As a simplification, a sub-network is
assumed to be either infected or not infected. An infected sub-
network sends malware to other sub-networks. Sub-networks
become infected with some probability once they have re-
ceived a certain threshold number of malware packets. This
probability increases when higher thresholds are met. Clearly
the propagation of these fictitious attacks is much simpler than
that of an actual worm or virus, but it captures the underlying
dynamics of an attack.
Four types of malware attacks are considered: no attack
(A1); a high-traffic, slow spreading attack (A2); a low-traffic,
slow-spreading attack (A3); and a low-traffic, fast-spreading
attack (A4). In each of these attacks, one subnetwork is
initially infected and sends malware to all other sub-networks.
Five response types are applied to each of these four
attack types: no response (R1), the H∞-optimal controller
response (R2), a threshold-based controller that implements
a filter of some fixed magnitude when a certain amount of
malicious packets are detected (R3), a controller that removes
all suspicious packets (y(t)) from each link (R4), and an
optimal controller that minimizes the cost ‖z‖2 (R5). For
the linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) optimization problem in
(R5), which is obtained as the limit of the H∞ problem as
γ → ∞, we use the expected value of
∫
∞
−∞
‖z‖2dt as the
quadratic cost, which we again denote by ‖z‖2 by a slight
abuse of notation.
A few details relating to the numerical analysis of these
controllers will now be given. The A matrix is set to be
the identity matrix multiplied by -1. Recall that this value
quantifies the exponential decay of malicious packets on the
link as they arrive at their destination sub-network. The b
quantity is set to 0.5. This value is consistent with a detection
rate (true-positive rate) of 0.7 and a very low (10−5) false-
positive rate – a scenario considered in [3]. The D matrix is
set up such that sub-networks are more likely to transfer the
worm within their group of three sub-networks. The C matrix
is set to be 2 multiplied by the identity matrix, which is derived
from values observed in the Ns-2 simulations to be explained
in Section IV-C. It is assumed that wn has a positive mean,
as most malware detection schemes are set up to, if anything,
overestimate the number of malicious packets. The standard
deviation of wn is relatively low. Also, the noise is assumed
to be white Gaussian noise, although in reality this noise may
well have some autocorrelation.
Simulations are run with three sets of cost functions (‖z‖2
and L) that differ in their coefficients. The ratio between the
cost on inbound malware packets x and the cost on filtering
packets u (which involves a cost on filtering legitimate packets
and also the filtering cost itself) is set at 10:1, 100:1, and
1000:1.
B. Matlab simulations
We first conduct a numerical analysis in Matlab. The
simulations where no response is applied demonstrate that
the assumed malware packet propagation rules mimic the “S-
shaped” behavior of worm or virus propagation fairly well [2].
Note that in Fig. 2 the number of malware packets arriving
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Fig. 2
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF SLOW WORM ATTACK WITH NO RESPONSE
APPLIED ON TWO (OUT OF 9) SUB-NETWORKS.
TABLE I
COST RATIOS (L) OF CONTROLLERS UNDER VARIOUS ATTACKS
(b = 0.5)
Attack R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
A1 0.00 3.48 0.00 2.35 2.04
A2 8.36 3.00 8.02 4.45 5.42
A3 9.07 2.88 5.76 4.42 4.71
A4 9.42 2.90 5.31 4.49 5.15
at the two graphed sub-networks starts small when only one
sub-network is initially infected. As the worm or virus spreads,
the number of inbound malware packets increases rapidly for
a period but eventually levels off when more and more sub-
networks become infected.
The H∞-optimal controller performs better than every other
controller whenever malware is present, as seen in Table I. In
this case, we choose a 100:1 malware packet to filtering action
cost ratio. The resulting γ∗ is 4.52.
Table II shows the actual costs incurred by the system in
each scenario with the same cost structure. The significantly
lower cost values for the H∞-optimal controller in the face
of attacks highlight its ability to filter enough to prevent sub-
networks from becoming infected.
The preventative ability of the H∞-optimal controller can
TABLE II
COSTS (‖z‖2) OF CONTROLLERS UNDER VARIOUS ATTACKS (b = 0.5)
(×103)
Attack R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
A1 0 1.172 0 0.788 0.682
A2 105.4 18.24 94.08 46.85 88.24
A3 22.68 5.579 16.77 12.50 10.34
A4 27.97 4.979 13.51 12.63 14.24
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Fig. 3
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF SLOW WORM ATTACK WITH H∞ RESPONSE
APPLIED ON TWO SUB-NETWORKS.
also be observed in Fig. 3. As soon as the first network
detects an increase in inbound malware packets shortly after
10 time units, the controller begins filtering significantly (see
Fig. 3 “Filtering Rate”) all across the network. This prevents
the second sub-network from becoming infected. We indeed
observe that it never sends malware packets in Fig. 3 “Malware
Sending Rate.”
The ability of the centralized H∞-optimal controller to
respond network-wide to an attack, and hence, increase fil-
tering rates significantly even on sub-networks where there
are not yet many malware packets being detected, provides an
advantage over other controllers. Another advantage is that it
tends to filter packets aggressively (see Fig. 3). We observe
this robustness property of the H∞-optimal controller in the
“Filtering Rate” graph of Fig. 3, where the number of packets
filtered is higher than the number of inbound malware packets.
This also contributes to preventing infections, decreasing cost
to the network (‖z‖2), and to guaranteeing some level of
performance (γ).
For comparison, Fig. 4 shows the performance of the
controller that removes all the estimated malware packets,
thereby disregarding measurement errors and network-wide
conditions. While it does over-filter, it does not filter network-
wide when a single sub-network detects significant numbers of
malware packets. Thus, the uninfected sub-network eventually
becomes infected at around time step 25, which causes it
to send malware (Fig. 4). The LQR optimal controller (R5),
on the other hand, does filter networkwide upon detection of
inbound malware packets anywhere in the network. It does
not, however, filter as much as the H∞-optimal controller.
Moreover, it is hindered in that it assumes a zero-mean
disturbance, an assumption that becomes more inaccurate as
more sub-networks become infected.
The H∞-optimal controller, on the other hand, tends to
incur relatively high costs and cost ratios when there are no
infected sub-networks due to its network-wide over-response
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Fig. 4
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF SLOW WORM ATTACK WITH THE CONTROLLER
THAT REMOVES AS MANY MALWARE PACKETS AS IT MEASURES ON TWO
SUB-NETWORKS.
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Fig. 5
NETWORK MODEL RESPONSE TO NO INFECTIONS WITH THE
H∞-OPTIMAL CONTROLLER.
(refer to Tables I and II). The very characteristics that make
it a strong controller in the face of attacks prove costly in the
absence of attacks. In fact, the theoretical worst-case attack is
actually quite small in magnitude and essentially maximizes L
by taking advantage of the tiny false alarms and corresponding
excessive filtering that inaccurate measurements induce in the
H∞-optimal controller. Figure 5 demonstrates this behavior.
Note that the negative number of inbound malware packets
indicates that all malware packets have been filtered and
legitimate traffic is being removed from the link.
Simulations were also run for other cost functions. The H∞-
optimal controller performed relatively better when there was
a greater cost put on the inbound malware packets and vice
versa. This is to be expected, as this controller is rewarded
Fig. 6
SCREENSHOT OF THE NS-2 SIMULATOR OUTPUT. GREEN PACKETS ARE
LEGITIMATE AND RED PACKETS ARE MALWARE.
more for being cautious when the inbound malware packets
increase in cost. When the b value was decreased from 0.5 to
0.3, the H∞-optimal controller also performs relatively better.
This decrease in b means that when filtering does occur, we
are less likely to actually filter a malicious packet, and thus
controllers that filter more are rewarded. A decreased b could
result from a lower true-positive rate, a higher false-positive
rate, or a higher ratio of legitimate to malicious traffic.
C. Ns-2 Implementation
We simulate the traffic control algorithm developed at the
packet level using the Ns-2 network simulator. Our goal is
to further investigate the characteristics of the designed H∞-
optimal controller and demonstrate its capabilities in a realistic
setting. To enable comparisons with the numerical results
obtained from Matlab simulations we define in Ns-2 the same
network topology as in Section IV, which is depicted in
Fig. 1. Depending on the specific application, the end nodes
in this graph may represent a sub-network or any logical or
physical set of hosts. As before, we assume high capacity links
between nodes such that no malware packet is dropped due to
congestion, corresponding to a worst-case scenario.
In order to simulate the filtering algorithm, we consider here
a specific two-part implementation consisting of monitoring
and filtering elements. The monitoring nodes, depicted as
hexagons in Fig. 6, associate a malware score s ∈ [0, 99] to
each individual packet passing through the link from the out-
side. As a simplification, we simulate only inbound monitoring
and filtering. However, a symmetrical outbound counterpart
of the scheme can easily be implemented. The monitoring
elements use this score s and a specific constant threshold
to make an initial estimate on the nature of the packet and
label it as malware or not. A count of these observed malware
packets gives y(t). The monitoring node may utilize any set
7of algorithms or approaches to determine this quantity. We
generate the scores randomly according to different probability
distributions for legitimate and malicious packets and use a
fixed threshold to simulate this process. This method is similar
in some ways to the scoring strategy proposed in [9].
The filtering elements depicted as boxes in Fig. 6 first
fetch the malware score s and the flag from the headers
of inbound packets, and then use either a heuristic or a
H∞ controller-based algorithm to make filtering decisions. In
this implementation, the algorithms decide on a time-varying
threshold value (different than the previous constant measure-
ment threshold), resulting in a dynamic filtering scheme. The
packets with a score higher than the threshold are filtered.
For comparison purposes, we simulate the R4 algorithm in
Section IV-A, which we denote as heuristic, in addition to the
H∞ algorithm. We do not simulate any filtering scheme with
a time-invariant threshold as it clearly would under perform
in a dynamic network environment when compared with the
dynamic threshold algorithms.
We calculate the H∞-optimal controller offline in Matlab
and transfer the results to the Ns-2 simulator. In accordance
with the model in Section II, the resulting controller decides
on the number of malware packets to be filtered at a given
time interval. We translate this number into a threshold value
by periodically observing the distribution of scores generated
by the monitoring element. Hence, the threshold is chosen
such that the number of packets with a score higher than the
threshold (i.e., to be filtered) matches the number dictated by
the H∞-optimal controller.
Remark IV.1. It is important to note that the example Ns-
2 implementation we choose here does not play a significant
role for the analysis and demonstration of our algorithm. In
fact, depending on the specific application at hand, one can
choose a variety of equivalent implementations without loss
of any generality. For example, the monitoring and filtering
elements can be parts of larger units each or combined within
a dedicated physical device. Or the monitoring element can
be deployed as a dedicated hardware device and the filtering
element as part of a firewall implementation. Clearly, the
possible combinations are numerous.
We simulate, compare, and contrast the H∞ and detection-
based heuristic filtering schemes in a variety of scenarios under
different cost structures, detection capabilities, and traffic
levels. The hypothetical scenarios we consider are summarized
as follows:
1) A cost on malware packets (x) to cost on filtering (u)
ratio of 100:1 in ‖z‖2 and L. We assume that the
monitoring devices are capable of scoring and labeling
only half of the malware packets correctly (S1).
2) The cost is the same as in Scenario 1, but we consider a
more pessimistic case where the monitoring device only
detects a quarter of the total malware packets (S2).
3) This scenario is the same as Scenario 1 except for an
increase in the cost coefficient ratio to 200:1 (S3).
4) Likewise, this scenario is the same as Scenario 2 with a
cost coefficient ratio of 200:1 (S4).
5) The final scenario matches Scenario 1 but has a cost
coefficient ratio of 0.1:1 (S5).
In all of the above cases, each end-node (sub-network) sends
randomly fluctuating 1000-KB legitimate traffic to all sub-
networks. In addition we consider an “infection” or worm-
like malware propagation scheme, where each sub-network
becomes “infected” with some probability if it receives suf-
ficiently many malware packets and afterward generates mal-
ware traffic of 200-KB to other nodes.
TABLE III
COST RESULTS OF NS-2 SIMULATIONS
H∞-Optimal Detection-Based
Scen. L ‖z‖2 (×106) γ∗ L ‖z‖2 (×106)
S1 3.9 77 3.2 4.9 147
S2 3.7 89 3.2 6.6 369
S3 4.2 87 4.2 6.9 287
S4 4.9 155 4.2 9.3 736
S5 0.31 0.68 0.3 1.05 6.78
The numerical results for both of the algorithms under
each scenario described above are summarized in Table III.
We observe here several expected characteristics of the H∞
controller such as optimality with respect to the cost functions
and robustness. In almost all of the cases and over a wide range
of cost coefficient ratios it outperforms the detection-based
heuristic scheme. More importantly, it exhibits robustness with
respect to variations in detection quality (see case 1 versus 2)
and guarantees an upper bound on the cost L. It is observed
that the L value is always near the theoretically calculated
bound γ∗. Another indication of the H∞-optimal controller’s
robustness is the satisfactory performance of the controller
even though it is calculated offline with estimated system
characteristics. This, along with the assumptions inherent in
the model, explains the occasional discrepancies observed
between L values and the theoretical upper-bounds γ∗.
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Fig. 7
VARIOUS INBOUND PACKET FLOW RATES TO SUB-NETWORK 1 UNDER
THE DETECTION-BASED FILTERING.
We next analyze the time-series data collected for a repre-
sentative sub-network. We depict various quantities of interest
x (malware packets that pass through the filter), y (packets
labeled as malware by monitor), and u (filtering rate) as in
Sub-section IV-B. In addition, we plot the the rate of falsely
positive labeled packets m and the rate of real malware flow,
w. Figure 7 shows the evolution of these quantities over time in
Scenario 1 under the detection-based scheme, whereas Fig. 8
depicts the counterpart for the H∞ controller. We observe that
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Fig. 8
VARIOUS INBOUND PACKET FLOW RATES TO SUB-NETWORK 1 UNDER
H∞ CONTROLLER.
the H∞ controller performs better than the detection-based
scheme in terms of removing the malware packets through
aggressive filtering in line with the preferences expressed in
the cost function. Concurrently, this leads to a slower infection
rate as can be inferred from the evolution of real malware flow
rate (w) in Fig. 8. On the other hand, when the cost coefficient
ratio changes to the one in Scenario 5, H∞ controller is
much less aggressive in filtering due to high cost of dropping
legitimate packets. This can be seen in Fig. 9, where the
maximum filtering rate is significantly lower that in other
scenarios.
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Fig. 9
VARIOUS INBOUND PACKET FLOW RATES TO SUB-NETWORK 1 UNDER
H∞ CONTROLLER WHEN THE COST COEFFICIENT RATIO IS 0.1 : 1
(SCENARIO 5).
We finally consider the case when one of the sub-networks
(say 5) is more valuable than others and needs more intensive
inbound filtering. This preference can easily be reflected to the
cost function by increasing the respective entry of the matrix
H in (4). Thus, the H∞ controller reacts accordingly and
filters more aggressively for this sub-network compared to any
other as depicted in Fig. 10.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied an application of robust control theory
to network security by investigating an H∞-optimal control
formulation of the network filtering problem that captures its
inherent challenges such as the base-rate fallacy and takes into
account relevant costs. The corresponding H∞-optimal con-
troller has been derived and analyzed numerically in Matlab
as well as simulated in Ns-2. The controller performs better
than alternative controllers when there is a significant amount
of malware traffic present. In addition, it provides a certain
performance guarantee for a wide range of conditions.
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INBOUND MALWARE PACKET FLOW RATES TO SUB-NETWORKS 1 AND 5
(MORE VALUABLE) UNDER H∞ CONTROLLER.
There exist several possible extensions to this work. Obtain-
ing a distributed version of this controller for a larger system
could be one future direction. Another research direction is the
application of similar H∞-optimal controllers to other network
security problems, such as spam filtering and DDoS attacks.
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